tv Capital News Today CSPAN May 10, 2011 11:00pm-2:00am EDT
>> i think you ask me what do we need from pakistan? we need to keep the lines of communication up and i have three border coordination centers that have afghan officers and pakistani officers in them 24 hours a day, seven days a week and that continues to build that cooperation, that trustwe have to continue to work against this common enemy that kills women and children. kills women and children. from pakistan, i need their continued pressure on the places where they are harboring these terrorist individuals. a lot of that it is in north and waziristan. that is where we have the most incursions across the border. that is where we know the haqqani leadership hangs out. we will continue work that very hard. but again, i feel very good
about where we have been with our relationship at my level. we will continue to work that very hard. i think that will make a difference in the long run. >> last question is lily. >> when you talk about the haqqani network specifically, what makes them so resilient? they continue to be a strong factor. are they recruiting? what is it that appeals to people on both sides of the border for the haqqani network to continue? >> i think you asked me that they have taken a great hit but they continue to come back? was that the question? >> yes, and what makes them so resilient? what is the appeal factor in the haqqani network? >> ok. as we talked about, they do have this uncanny ability to continue to regenerate forces in
the madrassas, in the places across the border in pakistan. the figure i have heard before is 10%. i do not know how true that is. but as we take out x amount over the course of a year, they will continue to grow about 10%. we have seen a great difference because we've taken out a lot of the leadership. when we first got here into regional command east, much of that leadership was experienced, battle hardened. we have taken them off the battlefield. now a lot of the leadership that we find, much, much younger, less experienced. the amount of supplies that they had, i have talked about the caches, over double what we took off the battlefield a year ago. that has to make an impact on what they are able to do. we are disrupting what the haqqani can do. why they have this ability to grow forces year and year -- remember, across that border,
this is the side drawn -- zadran tribe there, and this is family ties, and there is no border for them. some live in afghanistan and some in pakistan. it is a family thing there and those family ties are very strong. we have to continue to work through our afghan counterparts, for pakistan a counterparts, to counter the rhetoric that haqqani has passed on to the people. the haqqani network is more of a mafia-cent ticket type organization as well. they continue to use fear tactics. they continue to coerce a 12- year-old boy to put explosives on his body, to walk into a crowded bazaar and blow himself up. what kind of people do that? haqqani do it. it is a great threat here and we have to continue to stay after. >> general, i will leave it with
you for any closing remarks you would like to make. >> thanks very much. i cannot see any of you back in washington, d.c. i do appreciate you taking the times to come ask questions. i appreciate talking to many of you, as i heard who was there throughout the year, and to pass on many of the of recessions we've had in regional command east. bottom line is that we've seen progress both in the security and governance and development. we continue to see that day by day. for that soldier sitting on top of bob, you know, sometimes very hard. sort of like groundhog day. but you get at my level here, use that progress every single day. and i feel very proud of our relationships with the afghan counterparts. the continued growth. they continue to get better. we value their relationship, that french of with him. but i also of got to say thanks to our families back at fort campbell, the communities that help us out. if they have been very, very good. and they have taken some huge
losses here. every single loss changes the life of many people back there. i carry these cards, i think many people of seen me carry these -- 101st soldiers and the other brigades that are within 101st here. everyone of these are a hero. we cannot forget the and practices have on their lives, their sacrifice, the sacrifice of their families. we have to do everything we can to take care of their families for the rest of their lives. we owe that to them. so we have to be able to honor our fallen like that. but very proud of what we have been able to accomplish here over the past year. if we know that there is still a lot of work to do. we feel very good about how we're going to turn this over to the first calvary division. that will take to the next day. they have a great team coming onboard. all the brigades will stay in place for the most part. they will start transitioning brigades over time. but they will have some in place for quite a while here as we transition over the year. we feel very good about where we have come. and we appreciate although you
do back there, getting the word out about our afghan counterparts, our coalition forces. and never forget our great, great fallen, our great heroes and our families. thanks very much. aerosol from bagram. >> thank you for all the time today and all the time you've given us over your past year while you've been deployed. godspeed to you and your forces coming home. >> thanks very much. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] >> on tomorrow's "washington journal," we will talk with rob andrews about military strategy in afghanistan and iraq. then arizona republican congressman jeff blake will get his take on raising the debt
ceiling and the federal deficit. later, former treasury department official matthew levitt discusses how al qaeda and other terrorist organizations are financed. "washington journal" each morning at 7:00 a.m. eastern. to and follow the house and senate when you want. c-span comprehensive resource on congress, the congressional crapo, makes it easy to find information about your elected officials, with daily schedules, a list of members, each day's committee hearings, plus the deal of house and senate sessions and progress of bills and notes. if congressional conical at c- span.org/congress. >> no a senate panel looks at the u.s. withdrawal plan and the overall strategy in afghanistan. and number of senators argued against a hasty exit from the country following the death of osama bin laden. the senate foreign relations committee is chaired by john kerry. this is two hours and 20
minutes. >> the hearing will come to order. my apologies to college, witnesses, and the audience alike for starting a little late. we have some business before the finance committee that i had to attend to. we appreciate everybody's patience. this is the third of six hearings on afghanistan and pakistan that we are holding this month. last week we explored, and some aspects of the end game in afghanistan, what it might look like, how we might better engage with pakistan on common
interests and threats. today we're focused on afghanistan and on the specific steps the administration might need to take to shift security responsibilities to afghan security forces by 2014. it is my hope that these hearings are going to help us develop a road map and at least brought in the understanding and engagement of the american people and its policy makers in the questions of how the united states can shift responsibility to afghanistan in a way that is still protecting our interests and increases our ability to respond to the threats on a global basis. a strongtunate to have panel of witnesses and i want to thank each of you for taking the time to be here today. osama bin laden's death was more than a critical triumph in our
fight against terrorism. it provides a potentially game changing opportunity to build momentum for a political solution in afghanistan that also bring greater stability to the region as well as ultimately enable the allies to bring their troops home. let me be clear -- i do not know of any serious policy person who believes that a unilateral precipitous withdrawal from afghanistan would somehow serve our interests or anybody's interest. i do not believe that that is a viable solution, a viable option. i do think that we ought to be working towards achieving the smallest footprint possible in afghanistan that is deemed necessary, a presence that impacts puts afghans in charge, pressing them to step up to the task. at the same time, as a secures
our interests and accomplishes our mission, which has not changed even with the death of osama bin laden. and that is, destroying al qaeda and preventing afghanistan from beginning -- from again becoming a terrorist sanctuary. i think one threshold really needs to be both stated and restated as we consider the options. and that is it is fundamentally unsustainable to continue spending $10 billion a month on a massive military operation with no end in sight. the good news is, i believe we do not have to. i am convinced that we can achieve our core goals at a more sustainable costs in both lives and dollars and structure. i hope our witnesses will really help us understand today the
nitty gritty details of how we can get there. to begin with, we have to take a hard look at the capability and the sustainability of the afghans to take responsibility for their own security. that is certainly the best course to transition, i think, in most people's judgment. but despite our best efforts there are challenges -- corruption, predatory behavior, incompetents, a skill set within the afghan army and police. attrition rates although slowly improving still remain debilitating. a series of deadly attacks by uniformed afghans against their own troops, the rome government officials, and our men and women in uniform has undermined trust and morale. on top of these problems, there is a question ultimately of money. resources. i am not sure that an afghan
security force of 350,000 people is sustainable by either them or us. the estimates are that it would cost about $8 billion to $10 billion a year to sustain a force of that size after the transition in 2014. even the most optimistic estimates are that the afghan government lost tax revenue will be around $2 billion. a $2.5 billion at the tops. that is total, my friends. who will pay the bills to avoid having those armed soldiers and police mobilized as part of an ex insurgency? the future of the security forces is only part of the discussion of what kind of afghan state we can afford to leave behind. how democratic, how capable, how free of corruption, how national, how organized to afghan institutions need to be to be able to provide the basic
services and basic security? what is good enough, a word we have heard applied to the standard by which we might transition? at every turn we have to ask what we can realistically accomplish in the next few years to build sufficient afghan capacity and focus on those areas. finally as we did in iraq, we need to determine how we can best support the political solutions, that everyone has agreed is ultimately the only way to resolve the crisis of afghanistan. i can and again and again from general petreaus to embassadors and and other military leaders, from the secretary of defense -- all have confirmed that there is no military solution. looming large in front of us is the pregnant question, what is the political solution?
we need to make our ultimate goal is absolutely clear for the sake of the american people, afghans, pakistan is and everyone else who has a stake in the outcome. the administration needs to send a clear signal with respect to the direction of the reconciliation efforts. our lack of clarity is perhaps causing afghanistan and pakistan and many other players to persistently hedge their bets and plan for the worst rather than the best. we have three distinguished witnesses today who are going to help us explore these issues. dr. david kilcullen is an expert on counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency it. it was a civilian adviser to general petreaus on the u.s. counterinsurgency missions in both iraq and afghanistan. dr. seth jones is a senior political scientist at the rand corporation. is a well-known expert on afghanistan and the author of
the book, in the graveyard of empires, america's war in afghanistan. stephen biddle is a senior fellow for defense policy at the council on foreign relations. an expert in defense policy and strategy. gentlemen, we look forward to your help in addressing many of the questions i have just posed. senator lugar. >> mr. chairman, i join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses and we look forward to a very important hearing with them. afghanistan has been important and to still be a source of threat to the united states security. on that we are all agreed. the question before us is whether afghanistan is important enough to justify the lives, the massive resources that are being spent their, especially given our nation's debt crisis, or can we achieve the most important national security goals in afghanistan essentially
preventing the taliban from taking over the government, and preventing afghan territory from being used as a terrorist safe haven at far less expense? at our first hearing on afghanistan last week, i offered four observations as a prelude. first, we're spending enormous national security resources in a single country. second, although threats to the u.s. national security to emanate from within afghanistan's borders, these may not be the most serious threats in the region and afghanistan may not be the most likely source of a major terrorist attack. third, the broad scope of our activities suggest that we are trying to remake the economic, political, and security culture of afghanistan, but that ambitious goal is beyond our powers. fourth, although alliance held in afghanistan is significant and appreciated, the heaviest
burden will continue to fall on the united states. these observations: the question whether our vast expenditures in afghanistan represent a rational allocation of our military and financial assets. this was true before osama bin laden was killed. his death encourages reflection our policy in afghanistan and may create some perceptual opportunities in the region. but a reassessment of our afghanistan policy on the basis of our overall gop political interest being served our is spending roughly $10 billion a month in that country was needed before our troops took out bin laden. hard geostrategic interests are threatened numerous interest, not just by terrorism. economic competition, energy and food prices, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and numerous other forces, and solving these problems will be much more difficult if we devote too many resources toward one country that historically has frustrated nation-building experiments. the obama administration has targeted july for a decision for our initial troop withdrawals. the president should not withdraw and archer in number of troops. rather, he should put forward a new plan that includes a definition of success in afghanistan. based on in that state's vital interest and a sober analysis of what is possible to achieve. i continue to stress that such a plan should include an explanation of what metrics must be achieved before the country is considered secure. we should also designate and eliminate those activities that are not in transit to our core objectives. measuring success according to
relative progress has very little meaning in afghanistan. undoubtedly we will make some progress when we're spending more than $100 billion per year in that country. the more important question is whether we have an efficient strategy for protecting our vital interests that does not involve massive open-ended expenditures and does not require us to have more faith than is justified in afghan institutions. on this context, kahne -- congress wasted no more about the prospective strategic partnership agreement under discussion with the afghan government. the cancellation of bilateral talks scheduled for last march underscored the progress on this a tremendous being slow. the president and his team also need to establish a much greater confidence regarding coalition efforts to train afghan security forces. a dot inspector general report
from march of this year concluded that the nato training mission, and i quote," lacked enough specialized personnel to and is innate, manage, and oversee the number of contracts and effectively manage the use of funds." the united states spent $9.2 billion in 2010 and more than $10 billion this year will be spent on this project. president obama has requested nearly $13 billion for training in 2012. the high cost of this program is evidence of its centrality to the administration's strategy. but doubts also exist about whether newly trained security forces can assume responsibility for providing security in the country anytime soon. and even if training begins to produce units capable of independent action, tribalism and the corruption inherent to
the central government create complications that could undercut the success of this experiment. in addition, after units are trained, what are u.s. obligations over the long term for sustaining them with equipment, pay, fuel, and other input? according to some estimates, this should cost more than $6 billion per year. i am hopeful these hearings will provide greater focus to the mission and the strategy in afghanistan in the context of broader u.s. some vital interests, and we look forward to our discussion this morning. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator lugar, very much. we will begin what dr. kilcullen and go down the table from there. if i ask everyone to try to keep your openings to around five minutes. a summary or false statements will be placed in the record as if read in full. and then we will have more chance for exchange with the senators. thank you.
>> thank you, mr. chairman, members of the committee, and i'm glad to be here insisted stingless company. i'll keep my opening remarks fairly brief. i want to focus narrowly on the question of what has to happen on the ground inside afghanistan in order to get to the point where we need to be in 2014. the way that you see the problem depends very much on whether you state that the insurgency, the taliban, is the problem of whether they are a symptom of a wider set of problems. i tend to the latter point of view. most of the work they have done in country of the last seven years or so suggest that we are looking at a much broader cycle of instability over which the taliban is only part. if you want to transition successfully, you need to address that whole cycle. the first element is corruption and criminality, which comes about in part because of the drug economy but also in large part because of the lack of accountability and corruption in
the international community assistance programs. what that does is create a tsunami of illicit cash that washes around the afghan system and creates incentives for abuse. the abuses the second part of the problem. it sometimes takes the form of actual abuse and violence, but it is most likely appropriation of properties, shakedowns, bribery, taking people's assets away, the denial of justice, and that second part of the cycle for its the third part, rage. and the rage is directed from the population, not only against corrupt act towards but the international community because they blame us for the behavior of corrupt people in their own districts. and the final part of the cycle is the fact that that rage empowers the taliban or whatever other insurgency element operating in a given district and creates the conditions that lead to the corruption and criminality in the first place.
that cycle, if you want to address it coming you need essentially four elements. a counter corruption element, a government reform act have annulment, he need some kind of political reconciliation element, and finally you need targeted measures against the insurgency itself. incentives are important but it is only one part of a much larger set of issues. you could characterize that as a stabilization problem. all those four elements i mentioned are present in the ice at campaign today. it is a question of how -- isaf campaign today. we're concentrating on defeating the taliban as a military force and making significant progress, i would argue, and that part of the problem. if all where we have failed to engage fully in the issues that will confront us for 2014 is in the other parts, in particular,
district-level reconciliation, anti-corruption, and reforming the corrupt and abusive practice of a variety of power elites inside afghanistan. not just government officials. not all are corrupt. there are some dedicated public servants within the afghan government. but there are also a lot of power elites at the district level. exploitative of the population. i see three pathways toward transition that we need to integrate and effectively do at the same time if we want to get there by 2014. the first pathway of a called the suppression part. it is a counternetwork approach, a counter-terrorism approach. it is about destroying the insurgency ability to threaten the transition for the future stability of the afghan state. it requires a lot of special forces, intelligence surveillance, and a constant effort, but it is the one area of the campaign where i think we
are doing particularly well. the second element or part is a stabilization part. that is essentially at the district level identifying all the inputs into what makes a stable district and carrying out insurgency operations to clear, hold, and then transition in each district. i think many members of the committee are very familiar with that part of a campaign. the third pathway is reconciliation, not just at the senior level with high-level taliban, but at a local level, and not fundamentally between the insurgency and the population, but among different power brokers at the district level leading to instability environment when we pull out of the districts which remain stable. i do not want to take any additional time to talk about those pathways. i would make one final comment which is that we have a constitutional process coming in
2014. the afghan government limits the term of the president to two terms. president karzai and is his second term now. that term will run out in the middle of 2014. who is our partner going to be toward the end of this transition process? it is an important factor to consider. all stop. and the interest of time. >> i will stop here in the interest of time. >> i want to lay out a couple of things which i think we should look at, a number of options, and the risks as we move forward. i think especially with the death of osama bin laden, in our view, our objectives should be
limited to two key issues. first is disrupting and dismantling, and defeating al qaeda and allied groups in the afghan-pakistan region. but obviously. now this is not just out i said. the suicide attack in times square arista and its parent. there were trade on a border that is quite porous. this -- they were trained on the border that is quite porous. this it has homeland security. and the sec is denying al qaeda and its allies in and out -- in afghanistan both a safe haven and an ally in afghanistan. if we remember the taliban regime in 1990 was not just a the best it was actually an ally of al qaeda. despite some differences.
i am going to lay out what i consider three possible options for moving 4. one of them as a counter- terrorism option, a second as a counterinsurgency, and the third is somewhere in between, which is where i will fall into. the first is a counter terrorist option. as i said earlier, coming from special operations forces, this really is a jigsaw -- jsoc mission to capture until on the ground. it will limply review a limit our focus to direct action footprint, with threats along the border. i would warn that there are several risks in the strategy that are worth understanding. the first is, it will reaffirm our regional perception that the u.s. is not a reliable ally. some people may consider that important, some minutes, but it is certainly the risk. the second and in my view it fails to eliminate the sanctuary
and an ally in afghanistan. it does not prevent an alily from emerging unless they are defeated or agreed to a settlement. second, i suspect that a precipitous american drawdown will encourage afghanistan's neighbors including pakistan to increase their support level to afghan insurgent groups, the haqqani network and the taliban as a bulwark against a perceived indian access into afghanistan. and as we will note in the question and answer session come my concern is with senior al qaeda leadership from is solid. to others, there is still the relationship with senior elements of the taliban and haqqani network. that is a concern. the second concern would be a comprehensive counterinsurgency option which decreases the u.s. footprint somewhat but is along
the same ones that exist right now. i will not going to this in much detail except that it probably unsustainable buff up from an american and in afghanistan. for a range of reasons that would be happy to get into letter. what i will very briefly, about 30 seconds outlined, is what i will call an afghan-led counterinsurgency options which levers united states forces efforts but also for counter insurgency. the specifics will be trained and equipped national army and police forces, support local police and village stability operations from the bottom-up, helping afghan communities push back against the insurgency. conducting some direct action operations and in providing a range of enablers, intelligence, civil affairs, and other efforts like that. i have numbers in my written testimony on what each of these
options might look like in terms of u.s. as well as afghan forces. let me just summarize really briefly in conclusion that there are several ways for the u.s. to achieve the limited objectives i noted earlier. one is if al qaeda is destroyed in the afghan-pakistan region and no longer poses a threat to the u.s. homeland. a second is that the taliban bridges ties with al qaeda and a third is if afghan national security forces and its allies is sufficiently degrade the insurgency. at the moment, in my view, all three means should be pursued simultaneously until one of them or some combination of them adequately achieves core u.s. objectives. thank you. >> very helpful. dr. bill. >> also like to thank the committee for speaking to you on the support issue. i've long thought that this is a close call on the analytical merits. if you will make that call in favor of waging the war, if in
order to realize the potential of securing of the answers we have at stake, we need to resolve some important ambiguities in the goals that we seek and the end states we are after. in 2001 we saw very ambitious and states that, but committed little resources. the end state we're seeking is still very ambiguous. is unclear what success would look like and that lack of clarity makes it hard to make good near term decisions all across a range of policy issues. my statement as an effort to reduce that ambiguity and tried to describe in more detail what and state we actually require a what they require is -- what in state we actually require. -- end state we actually require. we tend to hear a lot about the ways in which pakistani saving
tens date -- to stabilize afghanistan, but the longer run dangers is that if we fail in afghanistan, it could tip an unstable pakistan into collapse with great implications for united states security. this limited conception of our interests implies a variety of different and states that could suffice to meet him. my statement goes into more detail than i will attend now. for now they will note pad at least two such less ambitious alternative conceptions of an acceptable end states might become 01, a decentralized version of today's very centralized democratic 2001 of afghan government. alternatively, for back of a letter term, all: internal mixed sovereignty system involving a series of apartments between kabul and the periphery with autonomy in exchange for the observance of several key red line restrictions on their behavior.
that would cap the worst abuses of terror days corruption while permitting lesser forms and to limit the use of afghanistan's territory as a basis for terrorism or subversion. these limited goals and less ambitious end states make success possible the political aims for which we are waging the war. they do not commit a radical reduction to very limited means. even modest aims in afghanistan are going to be very hard to attain. if we couple realistically limited ambitions with unrealistically limited means and resources, we run the risk of duplicating the 2001 mismatch between ends and means that got us into the fix that we face in recent years. in particular, i'm very skeptical that a small footprint counter terrorist strategy can secure our real interest, whether in afghanistan or in pakistan, for the reason that my statement
treats in some detail on which i would be happy to discuss in response to your questions. >> indeed, thank you all very much. it is a good framing of the beginning of this discussion which is very important. and very tricky. i think i have heard three different -- there is so much to focus on and i hope with all our colleagues here we are going to get to all of it as we go forward. one questioner does not have to cover another bases. let me focus on one of the most important components of this, which is defining the mission. i've heard three different things from all of you. and you are the experts and you are sitting here and you see a threat to pakistan and a potential to stabilization that they have an impact ultimately -- that could have an impact ultimately on that country.
you. for one set of choices -- you put forward one set of choices, counterinsurgency, and you are more limited. but i want to see if we can to define why we should be there now. what is our interest? is our interest on larger, stable afghanistan because of this threat to pakistan? this is simply our ability to be able to protect our interests and sufficiently prevent the return of al qaeda and destroy it ultimately. i think to have you had mentioned the destruction of al qaeda. one of you mentioned the disruption. is it possible for us to agree? it is hard for the american people to fill confident about where we're going if we cannot give a simple, well agreed upon,
broad consensus definition on what the mission is. what exactly is the mission in afghanistan, dr. kilcullen? >> thank you, senator. i do not speak for the administration but i think they have expressed very clearly. and what dr. john so that, the court goal that the white house has put forward is the idea that to disrupt, defeat, and dismantle al qaeda and the region. and in afghanistan, and generate a stable enough platform to create that overall goal. you can look at it in terms of transition in one sentence. i think the mission of the moment now in afghanistan is to make the country stable enough that we can reduce the u.s. footprint to a sustainable level without an unacceptable
drop in security. of course, there are two important choices there, sustainable and unacceptable. sustainable means, politically but also fiscally sustainable. unacceptable i think translates to the administration's corrado, an unacceptable drop of security as one that undermines our ability to eventually disrupt and defeat al qaeda in the region. we are making afghanistan stable as a means to the and of defeating al qaeda in the region. and that as a lobar compared to bigger ones in the past. but it will not cost a lot of resources to get there. that's probably a separate question. >> we will come back to that in a minute. dr. jones, do you agree? >> i am comfortable with dr. kilcullen's definition. i would say just to support him, what we do not want is an attack on the u.s. homeland.
that emanates from this region and we do not want in my view a government for a group that allows training camps and missions to the plan from this region. that is what i think we can reliably tell the american public we are looking to prevent. >> dr. bill? >> i agree wholeheartedly with my new members on the panel. i would be cautious of identifying the threats to narrowly around al qaeda. it has been the primary source in the past. if this destruction leads other organizations to shift their aims in ways that they have not heretofore and take up the banner of al qaeda's war against the distant enemy, the underlying identification of our interest implies that we would then have to broaden our target someone. but the focus of that is exactly as dr. docca: -- dr. kilcullen and dr. jones has said. >> let me elaborate on that.
what degree of the death of osama bin laden could pakistan joined wholeheartedly in the severed, focus on the haqqani network, harness the -- or tame the disparate instance of the isi, to what extent could their decision greatly alter the choices that we face and indeed the length of the struggle? dr. kilcullen? >> in fact, dr. jones' organization, the rand corporation, did a study of impart what would be the effect of removing a sanctuary on the chances of -- the chances of success.
i am pretty sure that you have a very significant improved chance if you can reduce the sanctuary. it is roughly about 86% of cases where you can successfully destroyed the insurgent sanctuary in enabling country, the government wins. but if you fail to destroy the site to work, you still win in about 60% of cases. it is very advantageous but it is not essential. i think we should bear that in mind when thinking about what we have expect from pakistan. but that was a also bear in mind the history of our relationship with pakistan which you know better than anybody else. which have some realism about our expectations of -- which have some realism about our expectations. i do not think we will see a significant lack of support, certainly not for the haqqani network, possibly not for others. >> and is that because they
perceive a very stable, strong central government, strong army in afghanistan is not in their interest? >> that may well be true. i think there is another instrumental region is just because an organization like the isi can turn on an organization like the haqqani network does not mean that they can turn it off. their ability to create mayhem and destruction for sponsoring a terrorist organization does not mean that you still control that organization. i am speaking hypothetically here obviously. but if indeed that pakistani intelligence services has had in the past some relationship with groups like the haqqani network, just because they had a previous relationship does not mean that they can decide to shut them down. that's the problem there. a lot of pakistanis are confronting an a. >> if dr. jones, what kind of cost are you looking at in your
mid-strategy, in your sort of not counter-terrorism platform but not a full-blown counterinsurgency? what is the annual amount chris margin it would vary by year depending on the size of the program. what it comes down to by 2015 is a smaller afghan national security force presence, depending on factors, a smaller u.s. footprint, and an afghan local police for print. that puts us -- i can give you the numbers by a year or your staff after the hearing. but it puts as well below the $12.8 billion were afghan nationals a first -- afghan security forces for fiscal year 2012. and it varies by year. >> is a more than $6 billion a year? >> depending on the air, between
$6,000,000,000.1410103554 dollars per year. but all it -- $6,000,000,000.1410103554 dollars per year. >> what is afghanistan, why would we want to stop attacks and the united states emanating from there, and one way of doing that is to eliminate training camps or support situations there in afghanistan. let me ask this question. some people long before the death of osama bin laden were writing about the fact that the attack on in addis its emanated -- on the united states emanated after iraq came into kuwait, the saudis calling for support from the united states, some reluctantly, a lot of american
troops landing in saudi arabia, and not only for the war but staying there. this created a situation of american presence on saudi soil that generated a great deal of the emphasis of osama bin laden and his people about america as the enemy. whether that is the case, secondly, there was a situation described by the russians of their attempt to do some of what we are attempting to do now, and that is to train afghan police or military people to bring stability into the villages and provinces and what have you. and they had some success for quite a period of time although they had the problems of the pashtun versus the people in the north and the rest. in due course, the russians ran down of money and time. they never quite got the job
done. there were still historical problems in afghanistan that were well beyond the thought of their centralization of all of this. i raise all of this because why is there that thought that this has to be the platform? why couldn't people come from yemen, from somalia, from wherever else somebody else -- in each of these countries are we planning to set up forces, the size and shape that we have afghanistan, and finally, given the russian experience, maybe we will do better. but there are many historians and your among the most eminent of these to. house that that portion shipped -- to point out that it does not lead to a good centralize situation. we might think in a more
sophisticated way of something less central, that we have bits and pieces of governance, that somehow negotiation, a packed upon -- a pact to bring stability, although it is difficult to imagine, hard to describe to the american people or anyone else how this comes about, how remains stable. my basic question gets back to why afghanistan? is it because originally we get crosswise without caid and? -- with al qaeda? described one alternative, a very small group of people that do intelligence jsoc work, thatd we keep an eye on everybody.
and this matter without getting into the governance of a situation that is proving to be very difficult if not impossible for us. does anybody have a comment about all that? go first, senator lugar. i know my colleagues have commons as well. all argue several things. al qaeda was created here, and the pressure of our area. its strongest support base is here as opposed to any other place in the world, somalia, yemen. if one looks at the tribal structures, cost and tribal structures and arranger -- pashtun tribal structures, they have fought with for several decades and providing sanctuary to a range of al qaeda leaders. they have a long-term relationship. there's also a range of militant groups that have supported al qaeda. i would strongly argue that this
is a safe haven in my view that is different from yemen, somalia, and other places. and in addition, if one looks at the bulk of the attacks over the past 10 years, the london attacked as successful, the madrid attack was successful, the transatlantic plot nearly successful, the attempted attack on my shahzad, they emanated from the individuals operating here. clearly yemen is a problem, but this is an extraordinary threat. >> i would agree with dr. jones that afghanistan is different as a haven than other prospective havens. i would from the reasons different agree the primary reason is its proximity to pakistan. it is important to distinguish different varieties and classes of terror threat. the threat emanating from places like yemen or somalia or elsewhere is important but none
the less conventional terrorism. the downstream a threat associated with the year in southeast asia is the particular collapse of the nuclear states facing an internal insurgency of its own in pakistan. one of very few scenarios i can think of that produces any plausible chance of terrorist getting weapons to use against the united states is a failure of consequence, we could tip an unstable pakistan into collapse of the military intelligence services split and the nuclear on a syllable -- a nuclear arsenal breaches containment. that is the difference between our strategic inference -- interest in afghanistan and elsewhere. >> but taking it back to the pakistan i did, the import of afghanistan is to prevent the
nuclear dispersion that that can -- and pakistan, another interesting twist and our hearing dialogue today. >> i wanted to note that all the examples came from pakistan, not afghanistan. the regional epicenter is not afghanistan. it is highly unlikely we would see a terror attack on the united states emanating from afghanistan. the risk is somewhat different in my view. it is that instability in afghanistan contribute to regional air instability that could undermine pakistan. that significantly raises the threat. and it is not just threat of terrorism but of nuclear confrontation with india of state collapse and abroad about the problems associated with changes in the security environment in pakistan.
what is much more likely is that there would be increased assets available to the pakistan the an afghan taliban, and other terrorist organizations, a much higher level of instability in pakistan, and that the potentially lead to all these negative consequences. the ultimate argument is correct. the pathway to it is one of regional instability and nuclear confrontation since south asia, that is what we have to think of as the primary outcome of failure in afghanistan. not so much someone from afghanistan threatening via united states, but threat from the united states emanating from that instability in the region. >> we are back to our problem. we have a hearing on afghanistan but in fact we are back over into pakistan again. and into the region. and maybe that is the correct analysis of where you ought to be having the hearing. but it does pose problems for
all the questions we are raising initially about what we do day- by-day in terms of our budget here, our forces and how many, and specifically in afghanistan. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator lugar. senator boxer. >> thank you. thank you all for your testimony. it is very important for us to do this because we are in afghanistan now for a very long time. and allied to do a reality check. and i will ended with a question to dr. jones, because his statement that a large-scale withdrawal of u.s. forces from afghanistan would reaffirm "the regional perception that the u.s. is not a reliable ally." that is very troubling to me. i want to correct you on that, doctor, if i might. are you with me? ok. talking about the mission.
i like to go back to why we went there. since most of us sitting here, either the house of the senate, we voted to go into afghanistan. why did we do it? we had no interest in doing that. i talked about the taliban for years. they would talk about the purpose and say, we have to get rid of the taliban. no one said the less we pass legislation never to recognize the country of afghanistan as long as it was led by the taliban. and i was proud to be involved with that in a bipartisan way. so we went in there because of the horrific attacks on september 11. you remember exactly why we went in there. we said we're going to get osama bin laden and al qaeda. that was the reason we went there. so all of this expansion, i think, of our role there, i like to take a back to that.
thanks to our president and the great military forces, we know that justice was served on bin laden and we did not do it with boots on the ground. we did it with counter- terrorism, a lot of what senator kerrey talked about during his presidential campaign, that is how we did it. did -- justice. but it is also a turning point that because of the intelligence we gathered during the raid, a sawmill was planning a significant role in the day-to- day operations. he was not just sitting there doing other things. he was plotting and planning. as the "new york times," quoted, he was not just a figurehead, he plotted and plan to come up ideas about targets, etc. this comes along with significant progress we've made against other al qaeda figures
in afghanistan in recent years. the current director of the cia, leon panetta, said, and i ask unanimous consent to places in the record, mr. chairman, says that the number of al qaeda in afghanistan is less than 50, and in the region, less than 500. you talk about the reader, and senator lugar is right to do that, less than 500. we have all these boots on the ground. i wantmy question and did give you some facts before i left the predicate. talk about the region say, if we withdraw, they're going to think we are not committed. and it will be upset with us, we're not a reliable ally. here is a situation -- pakistan is now the second-largest recipient of u.s. foreign assistance. receiving $4.3 billion in fiscal year 2010. that is not controversial but i assume that we're going to keep
helping pakistan and i am one that believes we have to with more. we know the u.s. has spent more in afghanistan than any other war. if anyone says, we're not committed to the region? how about a hundred thousand forces we still have on the ground? $500 billion we have spent, $10 billion a month, we can ill afford it. let's be frank, there are certain military people who say that our biggest threat is our debt. we have to look at all of these things. we train 125,000 members of the afghan police and 159,000 members of the afghan army. they have less than 50 al qaeda. and we have spent $26 billion equipping these soldiers and these police that we have trained. but tragically, we have lost 1562 americans, more have been wounded, and you've seen some of those wounds, unimaginable injuries. unimaginable injuries, and we
know a growing number of our personnel suffered a loss of more than one limb or devastating injuries. and all this money that is going into that region, why are you confident that more time, more money, and the loss of more american lives will change that view? did people there have a right to assume this level of assistance forever? isn't there a time when every country has to say, we believe in our country, we will defend ourselves? special since we have trained all of these troops. we have 59,000 -- 159,000 .fghan national army trained
>> it is an unfortunate perception and it was not the primary component of my critique of the counterterrorism strategy, but it is an unfortunate reality in the region and will impact other countries the way other countries will behave. i would add a couple of things. audit -- on the numbers of al qaeda, i will disagree for a moment. almost every tribe operates on both sides of the pakistan- afghan -- afghanistan border. they look for a vacuum. if we push out of afghanistan, it allows -- they will push back parade i would not draw a strong line among -- along the line. just to highlight, my biggest
critique of the counterterrorism strategy is that it does not -- it is not an effective strategy to minimize afghanistan from becoming a sanctuary or an allied. it would be a serious problem for the united states. i do not think you give enough credit to the people of afghanistan you do not want the taliban. they have these trains military and nobody is saying that we would not have counter-terrorism forces there. i think your critique of that is misplaced. that is how we got osama bin
laden and that is how we got the other leaders. to live by somebody else's reality or perception of reality is not the way to go. i've got my whole life with people perceiving things differently than i do. but you have to fight for what is real. but israel is the dead, the wounded, and the cost. -- but what is a real is the dead, the wanted, and the cost. you paid way too drastic a picture as what would happen if we do not have the blitz on the grounds. no one is suggesting that we did not have a presence. i think your testimony is very disturbing to me. because they say that is true, we might as well have policy based on their faulty perception. it is risky business. is went to china and they have a lot of misperceptions.
>> do you want to answer? >> one of the issues i have been involved with is having afghanistan up for themselves. i would just say that what i am talking about is decreasing the foot print, but supporting afghans to fight for themselves. it is out can communities to actively fought for them. i would say that i agree with you. afghans are willing to combat the taliban. we have seen that. >> good. he would have been 2014 and 40,000 american troops but on the grounds. i do not think that is the right foot prints. we need to stop the combat
forces and concentrate on the other ways. >> that we placed in the record. senator corker. >> i appreciate your testimony and i have enjoyed all bets. the issue of pakistan has, and each of your testimony is and questions from people here. should we reached an agreement with pakistan on what our joint efforts are going to be as it relates to the afghanistan? but let that be part of their the question as it relates to aid to that country. we should absolutely understand with a fairly on reliable partner today that our goals are going to be exactly the same and let that be a component of the aid that goes to their country? >> thank you.
i think we already have. it was designed to be part of the process of bringing that agreement to question. the problem is not that, it is that we do that have a trust for the interlocutor that we can deal with with those kinds of issues. not to say that the pakistan government is backing or supporting the opposition, but that is very difficult to know at what level that supports stops. it is pretty clear that some elements have taken is supportive attitude not only to the taliban, and other terrorist organizations, but also to groups associated with al qaeda. does that mean that somebody -- is a bit of a question.
it is very difficult to get to an agreement that is going to stick with pakistan. the best thing we can do to limit our vulnerability is to successfully prosecute the campaign in afghanistan dredged the more stable we make the environment in afghanistan, the more we damage the taliban, the less use it is for anybody inside of pakistan to support or enable the taliban as a proxy instrument. that undermines the motivation and the capability on their parts. >> i think the question gets back to long run objectives. part of the problem in our relationship with pakistan is that they are hedging against the expectation that the united states has on realistic games. in order to protect themselves against that possibility, they maintain links with organizations that make success less likely, but that building a
second best alternative for them. part of the problem of coming to a relationship with pakistan that is less pathological is a greater degree of clarity on our part of what we are saying about the ability to secure what we are sticking with the resources there willing to provide and our ability to negotiate actively with parties in the region to try and bring about some mutual condition that meets all of our interests. we are in the process of trying to engage in talks with the afghan government now. there may be reconciliation talks beginning. the complexity of those should not be underestimated. if we are going to engage in serious reconciliation talks in south asia, it has to of all pakistan. it has to enable them to try and realize some of their interests as well as ours in any settlement that emerges. else they will use their spoiler to destroy any progress that can
be made toward that. if we did not arrive at some mutually agreeable understanding of what the end states looks like, such that pakistan stops trying to undermine it because they do not think they will get -- what they will get is something they can live with, they have made impressive capacity to heads in ways that will receive an outcome we can live with. >> how does the fact that any kind of afghanistan -- if we get to a good enough, and i agree with the testimony that it is not clear what good enough is and that creates some of the problems you're talking to. if we get a good enough, afghanistan will not exist without us. they will be our suppletive. there is no way they tend continue -- they can continue to take care of the army and the police on the grounds. it is just not possible they will be our supplicant in a way
that any country has been. how does that play into the equation but on the afghan side and on the pakistan side? the reds the people have of the ground as it relates to the many problems that exist there. >> it cost us roughly $12 billion right now per year to support the afghan national security force, police, and military. even if we were to still be supporting those forces at that same level, and be providing roughly the same amount of support and civilian assistant in 2014, that is still an 85% reduction. >> but there still are supplicant. >> absolutely. a lesser objective of reducing
after a dependent on the international community. there is a heavy investment face up front that sometimes goes for tenor 12 years followed by a long drawn-out tell that to go 20 or 30 years. most successful examples of all that. the trick is to get to the second phase, a much reduced costs. that is what transition is all about between now and 2014, getting ourselves in a position with the afghans can continue to suppress the instability and terrorism in their area. 80% lower than it is today. >> a couple of quick comments. afghanistan has always been a red tier states. it is always -- during the cold war, it received both american and soviet assistance. the burden is on us -- is on us
to do two things. the first one is to get others to help shed the burden, whether it is neighbors. how can neighbors and others with an interest shelled share some of these costs? the second is to put afghanistan on at least the road where it can increase its revenue basis. if one looks at the lithium, copper, iron mines that are completely or largely untapped in afghanistan, there are ways that 110 began to increase the government's ability to cover some of those costs. >> it is important to note that for most of the 20th century, afghanistan was stable periods during that time, when dennis can -- when afghanistan was unstable and peace, it was a war on the system. the majority of all government
revenue in afghanistan was coming from foreign assistance that did not necessarily make afghanistan a source of instability for its region of. to call the supplicant is accurate in some senses, but it implies that the apple -- the afghans will find it unacceptable. there is an historic record to -- that suggest that pakistan is able to operates and not finding this to be a violation of their sovereignty. >> could ask one more question? the difference, though, have they ever had this large of a trained it sinful and military -- the money that we will need to get to go to them for years, will have to go to them. those armed troops will do something with the arms of their not getting paid. that dynamic will be very different this time if we ever get to good enough.
>> it is important to distinguish the wartime security requirements of the state and a peace time wartime sick -- peacetime security requirements of the state. part of the planning process for building up, however, should be some thoughts of how we're going to demobilize its if and when we reach a point where either we get to the point where it is no longer necessary. we're building an institution that cannot be built down, it will be a destabilizing element within a state and will never be able to afford a military establishment. normally, one expects that there will be a process of demobilization. when one thinks about the revenue streams required for afghan security forces, one is
to differentiate between the waging of the war and the would be due required in steady state once that is over. >> thank you very much. >> thank you for holding this hearing. i think it is very important. notof the things we're getting too, and senator kerry asked that dick overall question -- how do we make the transition? it seems to me and we used to talk about this some. this is the issue of a flexible transition deadline. president obama in that national security order talked about july 11 being the date for an accelerated transition. he really emphasize that. the accelerated transition.
somehow, we've gotten ourselves into the position where we are not talking anymore about an accelerated transition to an afghan operation in july 2011. we have now moved to 2014. i am trying to figure out how that all happened. it appears that all three of you agree that we should be doing that. and that the reason is the mission and i think has been panned down to defeat, disrupt, dismantle al qaeda in the afghan pact region. what i cannot understand is if we had the accelerated transition deadline and we move in that direction, what is it that this happened that keeps moving down the road? is it a failure of the afghans to really step up to the plate?
it is that the corruption? is it the inadequate partnership? what is going on here that has caused that? that is the big question back in my state. the other question that comes up is why do we keep moving this down the road? >> last november, in lisbon, in portugal, the nato countries involved in the campaign got together for a meeting. they reviewed progress and made the decision -- i think that we are entering what i would characterize as a war examination windows of the we are basically getting to the
point where we need to be getting that transition to full at can control. the administration they to of all is said that there will be conditions based. silicon -- it will depend on how banks cannot on the ground. i think he will start to see a process that is already happening. all provinces and districts and towns centers are starting to transition to afghan national security force control. the next ring out to be next in the prior to order. we're also seeing significant centers for the capital in the south. there will certainly be some transition activity this year. i would caution members of the committee into thinking that that means we can immediately
pull those troops out of the country. once troops have left afghanistan, it is almost impossible to get them back in, but transition is much like that children's game jenga. it is an experiment. the security environment changes in unpredictable ways. we are gone to see a significant transition activity beginning this year. we're already seeing some very sigma evident progress insecurity in the last 18 months. whether and how that translates into a drawdown of troops, i think, is a different matter, but we should see some this year. very strong progress by 2014. all --n't worry you at you talk about nato, but it looks like the major nato forces are coming out much sooner than
2014. of the british and the polished, aren't there deadlines this year or next year? the british will be there. >> all the way to 2014? >> yes, absolutely. it is not a matter of the coalition, it is a matter of various exhibits military progress, not matched by the political and reconciliation process. the suit is not about military success, it is about sustainability of congress. >> is a combination of nation- building and the kind of efforts
we are talking about. i think that dr. jones talked about that particular area and the border were al qaeda is partnering with tribes in the region. are we putting and the resources that we need to put into that area. this is the area were all these folks are out. why aren't all dark resources focused on that area? why aren't we having that be our primary focus if that is what our mission is, to feed al qaeda and the people there partnered with him. >> i think our forces are primarily focusing on two areas. one is rc east. in that sense, our priorities are roughly accurate. -- i i would also note
would strongly suggest that both historically and presently, the answer is not only a central government in afghanistan. that is an historical westernize approach to understanding afghanistan. i would argue that if we look at transition, some of the more successful areas the province has largely transition from taliban control to allied control. they have a very small special forces. they have rebelled against the taliban. that is part of a transition period in that case, it is not a central government presence.
it is a local present as well. that is what we missed in the nine years from their strategy in afghanistan. the central government does not like that trend. they see that as a threat. having militias and locally armed operations, i think he is very well she washy on that. >> i think the concern in my discussions with the palace has been if these forces are operating against the central government, that is the most significant concern. if they are large and defensive and that has not been in the case. these are village level small tribal community levels. these are not militias.
>> i think it's fair to say that it is a general matter that the karzei government has not been as enthusiastic as we have then. it brings us to the point that the relative priority we place on a security efforts is opposed to the government reform efforts. the political strategy and the approach that we will take to induce the karzei government is currently substantially less enthusiastic than we are about decentralization to move in the direction we would like them to move is a tremendous unmapped priority right now. for understandable reasons, the command has believe that it needs to show early progress and security. that is a requirement. do you think if what we do is to prioritize security to the point where we simply kick the can
down the road, we run the risk of undermining the security improvements that we are bonding at such great cost to day parade in terms of -- to the extent that we need to change parties -- priorities, a change i would like to see as an increased emphasis on doing the things we have to do in order to fill end the missing implementation guide. the deadline has moved some house from 2011 to 2014. if one is going to be fair to them, what this really represents is a great degree of specificity still substantially lacking on what the in state is supposed to be. the original announcement was the beginning of something.
very vague as to what the end of something look like. no indication of the west point speech of whether what began in 2011 would end by 2013, 2014, 2015. the administration has been painting a slightly more detailed picture of what happens later. were detailed picture than that is needed for all sorts of reasons, both strategic and political. >> thank you. >> i want to check on some history here. he offered up osama bin laden providing he was transferred to a third country. >> maya understanding is that
cia chief station sat down for talks along the border, offered alternative and that was rejected by the taliban. >> when the bombing started, was there not an offer made at that point to give him up? >> i am not aware of such an offer. >> some people in the region have suggested that the taliban have been some let's shaken by this loss of power and the loss of personnel. therefore arguments made by some but the taliban will not in fact be welcome to al qaeda that because they're more interested in their own political power and possibilities within afghanistan itself. can you comment on that?
i want to add one historical point. the taliban say rented in 2001. -- surrendered in 2001. it was delivered to president karzei, but people -- omar moved into pakistan, but the majority of the leadership surrendered the karzei government i'm back to their properties and said afghanistan and tried to live in peace. what happened after that is what i would characterize as a failed peace making activity were we continued efforts on the qaeda and the number of factors
and the at penn empire mets -- they went after these people lead surrendered. about 80-year periods, most of the people fled under the threat of torture or execution or abuse by these into pakistan. a reformed their organization. that is six months after the invasion of iraq. there is an afghan history that we need to think about that is more recent than the 19th centuries. >> that is exactly what i'm getting at. justice is really the framers -- framework. >> the taliban initially was an artificial -- some people may be
aware of an afghan -- his father was a famous warlords in the area. he was the first warlord to be executed by the taliban in the early 1990's. they hang him -- they hate him from a battle -- from a tank. that indicates some of the problem right now. the people that are working with us, they are long standing enemies of the taliban. i to speak with a large number of afghans in the field, including some very closely aligned with the opposition. what you tend to get from them as a statement to the effect that we do not like the
pakistanis, we do not like al qaeda @. they will say, we're willing to swear off allegiance to of qaeda, we're willing to promise not to be a threat to any other country, we are willing to consider more reforms to left and governance, but we need foreign troops to leave the country. you've got to put a huge rain of salt on comments like that from people with an organization that is carried a purse and disorganized and the way that the taliban is. but you do get a similar kind of thing from lots of different people. you recognize that we screwed jobs until learned our lesson. tammy come back and be part of our future family?
our interest are to protect us from being attacked again. to adopt what you said, destroyed at qaeda. that stability is not going to, until you have some capacity for justice. and for different groups to be adequately represented in the power structure. >> that is a very good way to characterize it. exclusive versus and close of security prated be tried to exclude groups of the security process, -- it be tried to make its inclusive, that is a much more complicated and longer- term process, but it has a higher chance of success. >> why is our current system supports it like it is. but not politically adept enough
or willing to be inclusive with respect to these other efforts? why is that not dimmed? why isn't that just plunking down a whole bunch of money, because we are backing a set of people would then add internal civil conflict where our interest could be satisfied differently? but i want to defer to dr. jones here. i think the point you are making a very important. there is a second component to that. is a political component about the village level and district level stability. u.s. forces in afghanistan have for a very long time been pursuing an inclusive security model trying to get the majority of access involved in local level peace deals involving security commitment on
all sides to create a resilience structure that resist the taliban. the problem that we have been connecting that to our afghan government that is part of the problem. >> to buy a degree -- to what degree could iranian interests, could russian interest be brought the table? is that a possibility? i would add china into that mix. >> called the d.c. them being able to play that role? what did you see strategically been a framework that bring civil together?
>> the iranians have been helpful in providing a range of development system in the west and center. they have a vested interest of developing a range of energy ties with afghanistan and pushing strongly for the prevention of the taliban government afghanistan. i think the wrong audience have a helpful role to play. i would caution the problems we will have in trying to bring everybody together, their interest to divert some much. if one looks at the primary russian support network, this seemed to be in the communities in the north. at some point, reconciliation discussions may be supported by pakistan, but are not going to
be supported by the russians. in that sense, they will all be clear friction points in some aspects of trying to bring regional countries together. >> this maybe nit follow-up to that, but -- a naive follow-up to that, in the past, we have talked about warlords and areas where they were leaders, and continued government in this country with a recognition of the difference between the people in the north and so forth. hypothetically, why do we return to local government of sorts? the warlords are more akin to
the country's north of the men stand or to iran or to even to the situation with pakistan. this was the case for afghanistan for a long time. afghanistan was never very self sustaining in terms of economic support. it was always buttressed by these alliance across the various borders. with favored president karzei and central government and the idea that there would be a national elections. national parliament. is the former situation one that is more promising in terms of the political stability we're talking about? >> when afghanistan has been stable, it is because there was an equilibrium relationship
between the periphery and the center. each side in a round of autonomy and a certain amount of obligations to each other. we have a substantial disequilibrium in which the periphery is too little constraints and sprang upon the population in the areas in which ways that give the taliban access to centers and undermine our efforts. some degree of a more secure equilibrium is necessary. the original plan -- that has proven to be unstable. to recast it radically in the direction of the periphery is where we are going now by default. it is not working well for us either. what we need to do is find something between the radical empowerment of local power brokers that we have fallen into by accident, and the insistence that we adopted to a dozen wind
direct i think there are a variety of ways to think about recasting those bargains in ways that would make a more sustainable. part of making them sustainable, is going to be a resource template from outside the system. it probably means from us. for the center to be able to enforce any type of redline restrictions on the behavior of local -- their ability to raise revenues sufficient to make the carrots lead of the six harsh is very limited. if we are going to aim for it is to reestablishment of a more plausible balance between the center and the periphery. empowering to have to the center in such a way that it can offer a mix of -- to reestablish the kind of bargains that existed in the audubon
area. >> it is a situation mario ball past -- testified. considerable continued economic support, the budget of the united states. the revenues will not be forthcoming. as we discussed the situation with our constituents and the congress, we're talking about an extreme of expenditures. this is not often discussed very publicly, except in this committee, because we bring it out because it is their loss politically. given the argument that we are having with regard to our current budgets, it is important to try to get some fix on what is likely to bring about the stability that we're talking about? you also raised the question, which is not necessarily
fighting, but president karzei is firm -- we do not know really as we have discussed at when terms of office come to an end or how power is sorted out. even as we're talking about the stability from our standpoint today, there was unstable political framework in terms of who runs these countries and their interaction with each other. this is beyond our ability to solve -- but it is an important factor to be considering. we can be talking about the slow of budgets and so forth going on and on, but we do not know with him. we already have real problems. in terms of delivery from the
karzei government, leaving the problems and pakistan. which are so difficult, we spent only $179 million of the $1.5 billion and the whole year. did to a lack of confidence and anybody disagreeing on what we should be spending. we finally get back to the thought that we're involved in all this because we do not want people plotting attacks on the united states of america. how much expense and for how long? >> one unfortunate reality for
much of the last 10 years, even on the justice front, is the choice we gave between central government justice and the taliban had shot a court. as part of -- shadow court. general petraeus has been a major supporter of, the choice now is what afghans have been given for generations, supporting justice in several areas. there is an answer here and this is the component that the doctor mentioned earlier. with 50 years of stability, that has been a key part of that. even on b $, the average cost for afghan national security forces for an individual is
about 32 million per year. but the local police, it is 6000 per year. we're talking about fairly small amount of money. 10,000 local police, that is -- we are seeing major progress in the south on this issue. i would say some of the progress we have had in the south is coming with a very small expense. >> with respect the cost of what would be required to keep afghanistan stable, it is important to distinguish between wartime cost and peacetime costs. they were typically receiving something in the order of 2or $300 million a year from all sources. relative to what we are now
spending to wage this war, and it is extraordinarily cheap. even if you've raised that, to account for the needs of wartime reconstruction, by a factor of 10, it would still be a small fraction of what we spend today. the investment required of us to sustained in afghanistan in the long term i think it would be a modest investment if we decide that we are unwilling to make that commitment, we are unwilling to make that investment, we will get an opportunity to run the social science experiment and see what happens, it afghanistan collapses. >> thank you. thank you for your tremendous testimony. >> obviously, everybody would opt for that expense if we knew
that we could get there. the question is, do we have the political framework to get there. >> i apologize for having missed most of this meeting. -- this hearing. hopefully i will not repeat some of the questions that have been raised. i think this follows the line of discussion that you were having with senator lugar. as a look at what it will take to sustain the afghan security forces, we are on an unsustainable course at the current levels. the target level require about $10 billion a year. the afghan government takes in about one under billion dollars revenue a year. there is a disconnect there. i want to start with a couple of questions.
we heard that there is consideration of increasing the target number of afghan security forces from 305,000 to as high as 378,000. my first question is, do we really need to do that? is that a realistic number? one of the prospects in terms of funding that's level of security forces of the u.s. ultimately foot in the bell, and that is a concern. i do not know who would like to address that first. >> we have covered this to some
extent. to rehash, do we need to do it? yes, we probably need to do it. if we lose the war, all the money would be to not. can we afford it? that is the purpose of focusing heavily on the drawdown right now. the abort -- 80% of the cost of the war is -- another 10% in civilian assistance. we could get to a much more sustainable position by drawing down u.s. forces by 2014 that would allow us to buy some time. the devil and the details is the issue of demobilization. if you expand the afghan security forces what are you doing with all those army guys afterwards? what is the plan for putting them into productive economically fruitful labor rather than having them on the
street with weapons. that has traditionally been the achilles' heel of most foreign security assistance programs of this type. it is something that we are willing to engage with as a priority problem as it closer to 2014. >> you agree with the assessment that we need to increase the afghan security forces to about 375,000 level? is that something that everyone else agrees with? >> yes. assuming that it triggers an american drawdown. the afghan national security forces are coming up as the u.s. all courses are going down. the additional part of that number was up to 30,000 afghan and local police. this is but a top down national security force and a bottle up
for the movie. -- subject to provisos. one being amplified. demobilization needs to be planned for during mobilization. postponing data as a consideration that we will deal with is dangerous parade -- a dangerous. they are doing literacy training that is designed to enable an eventual reabsorption of discourse into a productive economy as it builds down. more generally, i think it is a fair criticism can be made that we're not devoting enough attention to this systematically thinking about the bill down process. the other proviso is that there is a strong tendency to see the problem of building an
indigenous military force in afghanistan and quantitative numerical terms. do we have enough police, soldiers, trainers? when you look at the history of the military performance of developing world's armies, but very rarely does failure occurs when it occurs because they do not have enough training courses or enough advisers. when they fail, it seems to me it is typically because the officer corps becomes politicized and corrupted because the society with which they are embedded is politicized and corrupted. military stand to be products of the society that produces them. a corrupt officer corps cannot command affected, that behavior from its troops. in general, it would be to our advantage to pay more attention to the problem of the politics of the afghan security force development rather than simply the merkel issues of do we have
-- to be a numerical issues of do we have -- to invoked -- developed the intelligence resources that are required in order to understand the question of the political orientation of the officer corps that we are creating. to understand whether or not we are heading toward the development of that the institution that is disinterested as we hope it is. or we're headed to an institution that looks more like the history of other similar organizations in other places. >> but me change subjects. last week, during our hearing, a few of the witnesses suggested that osama bin laden death would give it some opportunity for further or more negotiations with the taliban members. do you agree with that assessment?
is there any evidence at this point to indicate how they might be reacting? >> we saw some pretty immediate commentary by taliban about the killing of osama bin laden. it is interesting to look at that commentary carried -- the commentary. the rep came out pretty quickly and said this will create the opportunity for people who want to negotiate, but felt like it could not abandon al qaeda to really see that as an opportunity to move on. some junior commanders called in and said, these guys are arabs. these guys are -- we are afghans. we're going to keep fighting. there is a significant element
in which the young girl generators -- generations of fighters have a different attitude than the leadership group back in pakistan. the former taliban foreign minister came out and said, this will increase our desire to fight. there are very different point of view coming from different parts of the taliban. but we are going to see is the acceleration of various processes that a party started. -- that have already started. the power of the central purple be diluted somewhat as we get into an internal power struggle with people who are struggling to see who will replace osama bin laden. it is not always appreciated how quite divisive a figure he is
within al qaeda. they may turn inward and spend some time organizing themselves. that creates a window of opportunity. i think we should recognize that a lot of people that support the taliban do so for economic reasons. these are business deals. there is a lot of other things that go into the mix other than simply politics. >> thank you. >> this is partly an intelligent question. what is our intelligence say about that relationship? when we say taliban, that includes a range of different militant groups. the strongest ties have often than -- elements of the insurgency will continue to
keep a relationship, a senior level relationship with the qaeda despite the death of osama bin laden. the onus is now on the taliban itself. give them a chance to break. they have the opportunity now, are we giving them a chance to break the ties and demonstrate that? i would say that they have an opportunity now. show us. >> thank you. i have a 12:00 meeting with senator mccain and others and i need to leave a great -- i need to leave. with -- i want to leave one question on the table and i would like to answer it for the record. i would like each of you to speak specifically to the political resolution. i want each of you to give your
version of what the political solution is and how you arrived at it. i would like to lay that out. again, i appreciate you coming in today. it did release scratches the surface in a number of areas only, what i would like to do is ask you if you would be willing to come back sometime just a discussion. we could have a little rapid- fire back-and-forth. we could really dig into some of the staff in a non hearing atmosphere. thank you for doing not. if you would answer that question for the record, about your vision of the political settlement, that would be very helpful. >> nobody seems to want to go first. i will throw myself on that
particular grenade. i think we should look at the constitutional crisis in 2014 as an opportunity as well as a problem. when president karzei at last term ended, there was a long hiatus before the elections in august and a long period before he finally began his second term in november. depending on how you define his term, his time as president either comes to an end in april 2014 or in november. at some point in 2014, he is gone. unless there is a significant change to the constitution. is it is quite likely that some people associate with the president may be thinking that it is a good idea at this point not go for the future stability of afghanistan, it makes sense to change the arrangement said that he can remain in office. there are other people in
parliament who are deeply opposed to that idea. that provide the opportunity for us to revisit some of the aspects of the constitutional makeup of the afghan state that really contributed to the problems but we have seen. we have to set the conditions under which afghans can have that discussion themselves. in 2002, the country was still smoking and there was not the ability to bring together a large enough group of people to represent the range of interest in afghanistan and have a genuine discussion about the appropriately forward. to some extent, the international community imposed solution, which is centralized power in the hands of the person to lead to exercise that power. he had to make a series of deals with power brokers across the afghan environment. it is not very difficult for him to make the structure work. i think we should have said
before president karzei. there is an opportunity to change that now. issues like the failure to authorize it -- there are no political parties in afghanistan. it is the taliban. legitimate political parties do not exist in the environment in afghanistan. the other factor is the number alliance. i'd think it is too easy to talk about a negotiated solution, but that solution leaves out the northern alliance the believed able sold -- they believe they will be sold down the river. there is an opportunity coming to see a turn more into very few of the makeup of the afghan
who is the third party that helped broker the deal? this is a role where some 80 able to play the role. he appears to have some slight -- some foresight. second, pakistan has to be involved in any discussions. they have to be a participate here in the discussions. in addition, i would support the construction of an of bert guinta. this seems to have been a necessary component of any deals made in northern ireland.
the individuals identified as support it. -- as supported. they may rethink the blacklists. it gives them a chance. how could this transpire, there are multiple avenues. those are key steps that have to thought through. it should still be bought through. think carefully. it supports the political wing. it would be quite helpful. >> there is an important relationship. if we insist on something that looks like 2001, and makes it hard to see this.
the television is not a broad besbroad base movement. this is on an equal basis. they have to compete. it is hard to see how they should see this being worse. essentializes actual power relative to what has become. we have this radical distinction between a paper blueprint for how it is supposed to be run with any reference to kabul and
the actual distribution which is mostly in the hands the power brokers that tend to tie the hands of kabul to an important degree. the right way forward is shifting the nominal powers of government outward and establishing forceable limits on the behavior of prayerful authorities such that we can keep them within bounds that do not treat public dissatisfaction with a predatory form of government. the key balance we need to pay attention to -- we have to ensure that local authority obeyed the foreign policy.
we have to prevent them from preying on their neighbors. we need to cap the corruption take by local officials in buenos that remove the economic threat. the key to doing this represents the ability to feed your family is. one of the most damaging forms is land taking by networks of corrupt officials for the benefit of the network that drives them into the arms of the caliban. it if we establish a series of
three configurations through deals, they say as long as to avoid any activities, including the illegal taking, we l. will align your a spirit of the economy. if you violate any of the terms, you can expect enforcement activity. if we arrive at a recast bargained, that opens up of attendees for reconciliation negotiations. they can be offered things like seats in parliament's. you can imagine there are terms
for a conversation with different factions about what conditions they might be able to come into the government. it is important that we regard the political role in a possibly reconfigured state. at the end of the day, a permanent presence in afghanistan is primarily means to an end. it seems to me that if we regarded as a means to an end, for a projection capability, we
need to be able to treated as part of the negotiation. >> time is limited. it is basically redlining behavior. all of us to go there are frustrated by the sense that it feels like we are fighting the mafia in many ways. we are fighting criminality. that is mostly what is happening. the cultural aspect, is that something that is part of the afghan culture or its talbian brand? >> it is largely a response to a
fairly recent events in afghanistan since 2001. especially the handing off to nato of responsibility. the united states lacks the ability to bring in. those perceptions lead to an expectation of abandonment and treat what they referred to as a negative shadow of the future. they have disincentives to run problems produce it create -- problems. it provides a safe exile where
this has created in network for officials to come together and predatory way is so as to -- ways as to provide for economic gain for members of the network while they have the opportunity. i do not see anything in the history of afghanistan that says it is an appropriate role for local government officials to throw people off their land and engaged in corrupt deals.
it is potentially reversible. >> as we of faults, it continues to change. i know you talked about how it needs to be defined more fully. when you spend time, i am sure president karzai -- it is getting back to the position. he wants to make accommodations. you want to have less trips on the ground. our state department was focused on a western democracy type situation. is the state department's in sync with what the military is not envisioning is given up their -- the envisioning is good
enough? like everyone is looking at me because i used to work in the state department. i would characterize history slightly differently. a lot of the decisions made for international ones. i think the garment is a with what the military is trying to achieve. -- i think it is in line with what the military is trying to achieve. it is what they are doing along side the military. we are looking at a substantial increase.
>> i think the relationship between the military and civilian agencies has definitely improved. there is a special forces team on the initiative. i think that they are right. this was an international issue for a long time. most everyone is on board. the biggest challenge is when you get into rural areas of afghanistan. the military footprint is still the largest by far. if agencies are restrained because of their presence at the
other security services that we rely upon to augment our security. that creates a short-term security benefit. to resolve these trade-offs, we are not be able to constrain everyone in afghanistan. there are other countries that are part of the coalition. it is still under developed. they get the degree of detailed agreement.
thank you for your contribution. >> as you were talking about the negotiated settlement, one of the things that no one mentions is what happens to protect the rights of afghan women. what can be and should we do to ensure that those rights are not negotiated away? >> the taliban change their position on the education of women.
we want women to work productively. it certainly was a response to popular pressure. people were saying what are the implications for us, one thing we will seek is that there is now a fairly sick of it damn body of public opinion in afghanistan in favor of -- fairly sick of the gant body of public opinion in afghanistan in favor of it -- fairly significant body of public opinion in afghanistan in favor of it. they will have to engage with that. >> i think this is an important
issue. it comes down to what is the vision that they will agree to? if it is much like the vision in 1990, the treatment of women was despicable. their positions are changing at least among some commanders. what is agreed is a different vision than they laid out in the past. i think that is acceptable.
local afghans across the country use this differently. in conservative areas of the south they may view it differently. we are not pushing instability into conservative places too quickly. in much of urban afghanistan, there has been a fundamental change on the rights of women from 10 years ago when i first walked into kabul. they are walking with only a veil. it is fundamentally different >> -- the difference.
>> one thing that is different is to allow for ways that when not necessarily be favored a conservative locales. if one is going to decentralize, one is going to allow the possibility of greater variants in the ways these issues are resolved. in exchange for a degree of acceptance, one could also -- obtain a degree of liberalism and parts of the country where attitudes toward education is more western than what a national consensus could secure? it is not a panacea. there are costs.
they are wired together the way they are. we do get something up. one important protection that can mitigate is if the system retains is democratic character. as much as the parts of afghanistan that have a radical system of women's right would be preferred, it is very few in numbers. as long as the representation hasted compete with others in the afghan public square who are likely to represent.
we built in radical oppression. they are going to be moving into an area that have greater variation. >> that only works if you have an election. he put it with the taking of land. >> how much are we willing to invest to get a better results the better results -- a better results. did the better results depend on transparency. that will probably be harder to obtain.
the divergence is greater. to some extent, you get what you pay for. the more ambitious an outcome we hold out for, the greater investment will be required of us. the ideal outcome is the 2001 bonn system. it is beyond practical. that alternative is realistic. a decentralized democracy is a greater commitment. if we are unwilling to make the
investment to bring about the democratic system, then they are stuck with outcomes we do not like that much. there is inevitably a relationship between our commitments and investments. >> thank you for staying. i wish i could have been here to hear the whole discussion. at this time, i will close the hearing. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011]
the free to take your jacket off. -- feel free to take your jacket off. it is a great honor to be here. i want to express my appreciation for taking the time to come out. thank you. bnl, you know, a week ago i delivered a commencement address. this is one of the most diverse places in the nation. they found that their class could claim heritage from 181
as america itself. we define ourselves as immigrants. they are willing to embrace america's ideals. this is why millions of people braved hardships and greater risks to come here. they could be free to work and worship. they can live their lives in peace and prosperity. they made their way to california. settled across the midwest.
guinea have deployed three times. do you know what he said? he said he left this country already. that is all he said. they are not big on speeches. raised in the states shortly after 9/11. her black. this the promise of the country. anyone can write to the next chapter. is the matter where you come from. what you look
a nation of immigrants. this is important. with the of who is into is not allowed to come into this country. debate is not new. issues touched deeply on our convictions of what it means be american. reason it is reform the immigration system. it raises strong feelings. it is easy for them to defer the
companies follow the rules. americans rightly demand minimum wage. at a disadvantage. think about it. over the past decade, even before the recession hit, they were struggling to get by. care to college tuition. reduce their away. that and gas prices. they are trying to reform the immigration system. to rise again.
a one prosperity. to reach that american dream. that is why in a crucial reform an economic imperative. reform also helped to make more impressive in the global economy. we have students from around the engineering and degrees at the top universities. laws discourage them using that to start a which train and to
create jobs for our competition. that makes no sense. talent we can attract. the contribution will benefit all americans. look at intel. look at google. look at ebay. all the jobs they created, everything that will take those was founded by an immigrant. we do not want the next one to in china or india. .
he said the united states will find it far more difficult to maintain a competitive edge for those who are able and willing. is not just the right thing to do. is smart for our economy. it is smart for our economy. that are demand that washington by mimi their responsibilities. that the system is broken. will it finally summon the something about it? that is why we are here.
been today by an secretary by the department of homeland security. janet the appalling tunnel has tirelessly on this issue. our commissioner is working diligently. we appreciate him. they are doing outstanding work. one of the greatest impediment about border security. of manpower and resources. considered enforcement once folks were in the country. unravel
and a bipartisan coalition. we forge it back when i was in the united states senate. borders first. even among those that were previously supported. have answered those questions. have strengthened border beyond what many believed was possible. we have more boots on the ground at any time in history. patrol has 20,000 agents.
the border control. say we its are need a higher fence. then we will need to throw in the moat. they will never be satisfied. i understand. that is politics. the measures we put in place are not getting results. we have 31% more drugs, 75% more weapons than ever before. far fewer to cross the illegally.
laws are on books, we are subject to removal. people with the best of intentions. sometimes when i talk to advocates, there was congress and change the law myself. is that how democracy works. we need to really keep up the for genuine and comprehensive reform. what i am committed to doing. we can do it. >> yes, we can. yes, we can.
again step we border is to fix the system as a whole. we need fewer people in search in the first place. allow agents to focus work, both sides of our border. where our focus should be. those in congress who previously walked back table and finish the work that we started. we have to put the politics aside. i'm confident we will find common ground. there is already a growing leaders across
america. i want to see more of them. we need to provide them the chance. we need to provide our farms a to do this. they can earn a legal status. respect families following the rules. we will reunite them more splitting them apart. tolerates rules, but those who follow the rules. well applicants wait for they are often
visiting the states. guzman and wives spend years apart. -- husbands and wives spent years apart. this is far right. is not who we are. we can do better than that. punishing innocent young people for the actions of their parents. should stop denying them the to serve in the military. that is why we need to pass the dream act. [applause] [applause]
passed the dream act through when democrats were in control. blocked when several republicans had previously it boded no. -- voted no. it is disappointing to get so close ally policy get in the way. it broke my heart knowing that a number of those bright students, hard are at risk of facing the agony of deportation. many grew up in this country. we love this country. they have no other place to call home. the idea that we punish them is kroll.
we are a better nation did this. we will keep fighting. we will keep up the fight for reform. this is where you come in. to have a constructive debate. we of yardy had a series of meetings about this. -- we have already had a series of meetings about this. this change old simile has to be driven by you, the american people. what steps where we can find common ground. i am asking you